In his essay “Violence and the Word,” Robert Cover defines autonomy by introducing the phrase “autonomy of judgement” as synonymous with “independence of the mind” (Cover, “Violence and the Word,” 1617). To Cover, autonomy references an individual’s ability to form thoughts and analsyes on their own, free from external influence. Legal interpreters like judges exercise this autonomy to reflect on legal meaning and develop a “coherent” understanding of the law, enabling them to apply it in a rational way (1617).
However, even though a legal interpreter relies on their autonomy to develop a rational understanding of a particular case, they must surrender that autonomy to rule on that case. Cover explains that the law exists within a world of violence (1601). In order to effectively address that violence, legal interpretations must be “effective” as well as coherent (1617). Interpretations therefore cannot depend on any single interpreter’s autonomy-derived understanding of the law. That understanding, however cohesive, lacks the “institutional capacity” to enforce the law (1606). In order to create enforceable rulings, interpreters must consider not only their own, autonomy-derived judgements but also the “social organization” of the legal institutions they serve (1617). Therefore, Cover proposes, legal interpreters must surrender their autonomy in order to maintain the law’s efficacy.
Immanuel Kant, in the second chapter of his work Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, parallels Cover’s understanding of autonomy. For example, both scholars discuss a nonphysical aspect of an individual’s autonomy, which Cover calls “judgement” and Kant calls “will” (Cover, “Violence and the Word,” 1617; Kant 542). Kant also parallels Cover by linking autonomy and reason. To Kant, individuals’ ability to think independently—which provides their inherent worth—allows them to act autonomously (Kant 536; Jankovic).1 Although Kant does not discuss autonomy within a legal structure like Cover does, Kant’s framing of autonomy nevertheless parallels Cover’s use of the term to reference a mental state connected to rational thinking.
Kant departs from Cover, however, via his understanding of the rational thinking that autonomy provides. Cover does not discuss autonomy as stemming from rational thinking, but rather as a quality that permits an individual to rationally analyze the law. To Cover, it seems, autonomy provides the opportunity for rational thought but does not itself arise from rational thought. In contrast, Kant’s philosophy emphasizes autonomy as dependent on, not the product of, rational decision-making. Kant ultimately defines an autonomous individual as someone who acts in accordance with the Supreme Principle of Morality rather than their own whims and desires (Jankovic; Kant 534, 536, 542). Individuals’ autonomy thus stems from their accordance with a reason-based law instead of their non-reason-based “impulsions” (Kant 530). To Kant, autonomy is more than the mental independence Cover references: it reflects an individual’s choice to accord with reason and thus to uphold their value as a rational being (Jankovic).
Zora Neale Hurston’s book Barracoon, which recounts the story of Oluae Kossola, does not mention the term “autonomy” (Hurston). However, Kossola’s story centers on marronage, a state of being inherently linked to autonomy. Marronage refers to the creation of a liminal space between enslavement and freedom. In other words, it acts as an alternative institution to oppressive power structures, allowing individuals to exercise autonomy even when mainstream society remains discriminatory and controlling (Bowles, “Marronage and Negotiation”). Marronage typically connotes enslaved peoples’ escape to and construction of an independent community outside of a slave society, but Barracoon expands that definition to include Africa Town, a community that Kossola and other formerly enslaved Africans founded post-emancipation (Bowles, “Marronage and Negotiation”). For Kossola, Africa Town provided physical and economic separation from his former enslaver, Tim Meaher. It also insulated him from Black people born in America, who “pick[ed] at” and verbally abused people born in Africa (Hurston chapt. 8). Africa Town thus allowed Kossola to separate himself from Jim Crow society and from pressure to conform to Black American culture. Instead, he could maintain his African identity.
With respect to the possibilities it created for Kossola, Africa Town offered more immediate, society-based autonomy than the internal autonomy that Cover and Kant discuss. However, it also demonstrates that maroon communities enable their inhabitants to practice a version of Kantian autonomy. Kossola explains that Africa Town inhabitants “[made] laws how to behave ourselves,” reflecting Kant’s assertion that autonomy comes from an individual’s regulation of their own behavior—although in this case, a community, not an individual, performed the regulation (Hurston chapt. 8; Jankovic). The community of Africa Town also enacted Kant’s belief that reason rather than individual desires dictate autonomy. For example, Africa Town punished drunkenness because alcohol “belong[s] to [a man] and he oughter rule it” rather than succumbing to its control (Hurston chapt. 8). The community thus asserted the Kantian ideal that individuals should exercise their autonomy by retaining control over their own actions rather than allowing external circumstances to control them. Africa Town offered Kossola and other Africans immediate and urgent autonomy from a discriminatory society, but it also demonstrates that that a Kantian understanding of autonomy can apply to a community, not just an individual.
- Kant employs the term “rational being” in his original means-end formulation (536). In the interest of formal consistency between my Key Terms, however, I employ “individual” to mean “rational being,” even though these words’ metaphysical connotations may differ. ↩︎
