In his Tanner lecture “Theorizing Racial Justice,” philosopher Charles W. Mills criticizes John Rawls’ theory of justice as inapplicable to the racially discriminatory United States. Mills’ insight reveals the inherent flaws in and necessity for revision of efforts towards justice in general.
Rawls proposes that individuals placed behind a hypothetical “veil of ignorance” would lack bias towards their own, arbitrarily imposed societal positions (Jankovic). From this “original position,” they could devise a truly just society based on the principle of equality for all, with exceptions to promote the wellbeing of the “least advantaged” (Rawls 720-721, 721). Mills contends that—contrary to Rawls’ intentions and Rawlsian scholars’ work—these principles of justice cannot apply to the United States (Mills 17). Rawls’ theory only works within “ideal societ[ies],” or rather, societies with relatively “sound” rather than “oppressive” institutions and structures (Mills 27-28, 28). However, the United States’ basic structures are and always have been “deeply and significantly affected” by racism (30). From its history of enslavement and segregation to its current mass incarceration rates, educational segregation, and voter discrimination, the United States remains a nation defined by oppression (30-34). Therefore, Mills contends, it is not an ‘ideal society,’ and Rawls’ principles of justice cannot create justice within it.
Mills argues that Rawls’ failure to recognize the US’ embedded racism reveals Rawls’ theory as “racialized liberalism” (11). Liberalism is a political theory “committed to the moral equality, freedom, and self-realization of individuals” (8). However, when liberal theories ignore people of color, whitewash history, and assign “schedule[s] of rights, protections, and freedoms” that are not actually distributed to people of color, they become “racialized liberalism” committed only to the “equality, freedom and self-realization” of white people (13, 8). Since Rawls’ theory leaves people of color out of its “social ontology,” it is best classified as racialized rather than true liberalism (8).
To construct a truly liberal theory of justice, Mills proposes that we should “perform a modified version of the Rawlsian thought-experiment” wherein individuals behind the veil of ignorance create just principles for a racially non-ideal society like the United States (46, 46-49). These principles would, Mills asserts, strive to “end racially unequal citizenship…racial exploitation…[and] racial disrespect” (49). His suggested shift in Rawlsian thought makes meaning beyond its proposition for a truly liberal theory of justice. It also demonstrates that justice is not a static concept. Instead, as a nation replete with injustice, the United States must continually rethink and reframe our imperfect conceptions of justice. Mills’ corrections would not present a perfectly just society, but they nevertheless offer a path towards increased racial justice. They thus demonstrate that redefining and reshaping justice can, in fact, lead towards its actualization.
Works Cited
Jankovic, Marija. “Justice in Holdings.” 12 September 2024, Humes 103, Davidson College, Davidson, NC. Lecture and slideshow.
Mills, Charles W. “Theorizing Racial Justice.” Tanner Lecture 2020, 12 February 2020, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, drive.google.com/file/d/13NfqyhnbSA2SFJb2Bti-AEdgEK7LpXIb/view. Revised lecture.
Rawls, John. “A Theory of Justice.” Philosophy for the 21st Century, edited by Stephen M. Cahn, Oxford University Press, 2002, drive.google.com/file/d/12mC5lbJio876D6gOHKn_F0P5YitsE1BZ/view.
