In his 1993 documentary Dance at Court, John Hill defines power as the ability to control motion. For example, the French king Louis XIV “turned dance into a weapon of the state” in order to “control the [French] aristocracy and consolidate total power in himself” (00:04:50; 00:04:00). Louis introduced ballet as the determining factor in nobles’ status at court: if their physical movements were not “models of elegance,” they were “disgraced” both on the ballroom floor and politically (00:06:35; 00:07:00). For the nobles, perfect control over their movements translated directly to political power. However, movement also reinforced Louis’ ultimate political control. Through dance, he represented himself as the Greek god Apollo, “bolster[ing] his claim” that his power stemmed from “divine right” (00:09:45; 00:08:47). Controlling his own motion reinforced his political power, even as controlling his nobles’ motions prevented them from challenging his sovereignty.
John Locke, in his Second Treatise of Government, discusses political power as the ability to punish rather than the ability to control motion. He contends that governments’ power originally stems from the state of nature, wherein each person has equal “power” to punish others who act unjustly (Locke sect. 4-5, 6-8). Governments gain the power to punish only when individuals voluntarily transfer that power from themselves to governing bodies: Locke writes that “nothing but the consent of any number of freemen […] could give beginning to any lawful government in the world” (sect. 99). This line of reasoning suggests that political power originates with individuals rather than divine ordinance, a revolutionary idea during Locke’s time (Jankovic [“Social Contract”]; Locke sect. 11, 95).
The book of Job explores a theological rather than political definition of power, suggesting that divine power is intertwined with divine justice. For example, Job concludes one of his speeches by saying, “Is it power? [Yahweh] is mighty! / Is it judgment? Who can summon Him?” (Book of Job [Scheindlin] 17). Poetry in Job demonstrates “syntactic-semantic parallelism,” or rather, “synonymity” between paired lines (26, 27). The paired lines above therefore suggest a parallel between Yahweh’s “power” in the first line and his “judgment” in the second. Since “judgement” here refers to a legal judgment from which Job hopes to receive justice, the lines also connect power to justice (“Book of Job” [Boyer]). Yahweh’s response to Job further links divine power and divine justice: rather than explain why he torments Job, Yahweh details Yahweh’s awesome power, which Job cannot hope to rival. This power imbalance persuades Job to “retract” his questions and accept Yahweh’s plan for him (Book of Job [Scheindlin] 143-57, 157). The book of Job thus defines divine power as Yahweh’s right to control justice.
Anna Deavere Smith parallels Job by introducing justice in terms of power: “when we talk about justice, what we’re really talking about is power,” she explains (Smith and Green). Efforst to empower oppressed individuals thus also function as efforts towards justice (Smith and Green). However, Smith does not actually define power: instead, she introduces the concept as part of her discussion of justice. Similarly, Raymond P. Scheindlin’s translation of Job focuses on Job’s desire and need for justice from Yahweh rather than the fact of Yahweh’s power (Book of Job [Scheindlin] 20-26, 30-40). Smith and Job’s focus on justice rather than power, to me, suggests that justice cannot be fully understood without power. Perhaps, then, power is best defined as the means by which justice can be distributed.
