In his article “Famine, Affluence and Morality,” philosopher Peter Singer discusses individuals’ moral duty to assist others in crisis. Singer believes that “if it is in [an individual’s] power to prevent something very bad from happening, without sacrificing anything else morally significant, [they] ought, morally, to do it” (Singer 231). Individuals, he implies, have a moral duty to maximize global wellbeing. However, society currently perceives “the imperatives of duty […] as distinct from what it would be good to do but not wrong to do” (236). In other words, doing good with one’s resources—particularly monetary resources—is “generous” but non-requisite in the minds of most modern individuals. Singer contends that this “present way of drawing the distinction [between charity and duty] […] cannot be supported” (235). When individuals view societally beneficial but personally costly acts as supererogatory instead of obligatory, they fall short of their moral obligation to maximize global good. Singer therefore contends that individuals must, morally speaking, devote their resources to crisis alleviation (239-43).
In his book Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Immanuel Kant defines duty not as an externally imposed responsibility, but as an internally born expression of good will (Kant 528). Good will gives individuals the power to govern themselves morally (Kant 527-8; Jankovic [“Kant”]). Duty, in turn, arises as the “concept…of a good will, exposed, however, to certain subjective limits and obstacles […] [which] bring it out by contrast and make it shine forth more brightly” (Kant 528). In other words, duty actualizes actions that good will demands “ought” to be done (530). Kant’s internally-focused interpretation of duty as an extension of individuals’ will thus contrasts with Singer’s externally focused assertion that duty is necessary to promote societal good.
Hannah Arendt, in her book Eichmann in Jerusalem, discusses conflicting interpretations of duty in Nazi official Adolf Eichmann’s trial by the Israeli government. During one police investigation, Eichmann “declared with great emphasis that he had lived his whole life […] according to a Kantian definition of duty,” as outlined above (Arendt chapt. 7). However, he reinterpreted Kant’s definition of duty when he joined the Nazi party, deciding that his duty stemmed from loyalty to the Nazi regime rather than from internal good will (chapt. 7). Eichmann thus reframed duty as the means by which he became an extension of the Nazi party’s will rather than as an actualization of his own will. Through this new definition of duty, Eichmann sought to minimize his responsibility for his crimes.
Eichmann’s interpretation proved irrelevant because the Nuremberg Trials had already established that “one who has committed criminal acts may not take refuge in superior orders nor in the doctrine that his crimes were acts of states” (“Opening Statement”). In other words, regardless of how he defined duty, Eichmann remained responsible for his crimes. This precedent reminds me that duty, whether to an internalized principle or an external party, does not excuse action. It shifts my question of duty from “what is duty?” to “duty to whom?”
Sophocles’ Antigone engages with this new question (“duty to whom?”) through its definition of duty as an expression of loyalty. Antigone’s duty to bury Polynices stems from her loyalty to the “mighty gods” (Sophocles 106). Creon, in contrast, prioritizes duty to government, which he expresses as “loyalty.” For example, Creon proclaims that “whoever proves his loyalty to the state – / I’ll prize that man in death as well as life” (68). Ultimately, Antigone’s duty to the gods takes priority over Creon’s loyalty to the state, since Antigone attains “glory” through her death, whereas Creon is a “fool” because he defies the gods (84, 127). These consequences echo Arendt’s reminder that duty must be chosen carefully: it does not absolve individuals’ responsibility for their actions.
