The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines banality as “anything trite or trivial; a commonplace” or, alternately, as “commonplace character” (“Banality”). In Hannah Arendt’s 1963 book Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, Arendt’s characterization of evil as banal initially seems to imply that evil is not important (Tӧmmel and d’Entreves; Arendt).1 Based on this interpretation of her work, Eichmann’s evil actions as part of the Third Reich are not important and do not justify his death. However, Arendt believes that Eichmann should be executed for those very actions (Boyer). This contradiction initially puzzled me. However, as I reconsider Arendt’s text in conjunction with its full title, I conclude that Arendt does not characterize evil as banal to make Eichmann’s evil seem unworthy of punishment. Instead, her subtitle highlights evil’s inherent presence not only in the Third Reich, but also in human nature itself.
Based on the OED’s definition of banality as “commonplace,” I read Eichmann’s actions as evil not because he himself was evil, but because he inhabited an evil context, Nazi Germany (“Banality”). In a setting whose categorical imperative was to “act in such a way that the Führer, if he knew your action, would approve it,” evil was “banal” because it was omnipresent (Die Technik des Staates 15-16, qtd. in Arendt). Eichmann’s evil actions within this context seem like the product of his identity as “a law-abiding citizen” rather than his internalized “base motives” (Arendt 24, 25). He acted evilly because of the evil inherent in his surroundings. Based on this understanding of evil, Arendt’s Eichmann in Jerusalem seems to imply that evil becomes “banal” through its widespread presence in a government or society, like the Nazi Party and Nazi Germany.
However, I find that considering “banal evil” as a societal problem ignores the OED’s definition of banality as “commonplace character” (“Banality”). To me, this second definition suggests that banality can be ingrained in a person’s character, or rather, their identity. Therefore, banal evil—a subset of banality—is not merely a product of state or societal culture. Instead, it must be considered an inherent part of an individual’s self. Interpreting Eichmann’s evil through this definition of banality suggests that his evil was part of him. However, as Arendt points out, he was “an average, ‘normal’ person,” even though he participated in evil acts (Arendt 26). His normalcy and his evil coexisted.
To me, this reading of evil and normalcy reconciles the two concepts, suggesting that evil is normal—or rather, banal. Arendt’s phrase “banal evil” does not trivialize Eichmann’s evil, nor does it classify his evil as a product of his Nazi context. Instead, Arendt suggests that Eichmann’s evil is unsurprising because evil is so deeply ingrained in human character that its manifestation may be considered banal. Thus Arendt’s single, simple adjective reframes my understanding of Eichmann’s trial: he deserves the punishment he receives from the Israeli government not because he is uniquely evil, but because he has chosen to actualize the banal evil every person carries within them.
- In the sections of Eichmann in Jerusalem that I read, Arendt offers no definition of evil. However, to me, “evil” describes a person or entity who repeatedly performs morally wrong actions that significantly harm other people. Kant’s Supreme Principle of Morality and my moral intuition both inform my understanding of actions that are morally wrong. However, regardless of whether I rely on Kant or my inherent understanding of right and wrong, I hold that the Nazi Party—for its perpetuation of the Holocaust if nothing else—is evil, making Eichmann’s actions on its behalf evil as well. I therefore refer to the Nazi party and Eichmann as evil throughout this text, even though Arendt does not explicitly define them as such. ↩︎
Works Cited
Arendt, Hannah. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil. 1963. New York, Penguin Books, 1992, drive.google.com/file/d/1-P8vSl1UDYcEv7OxVRlQYEO8X5gJrR9F/view.
“Banality, N.” Oxford English Dictionary, July 2023. doi.org/10.1093/OED/9178803586.
Boyer, Patricio. “Eichmann in Jerusalem.” 22 October 2024, Humes 103, Davidson College, Davidson, NC. Lecture and slideshow.
Tӧmmel, Tatjana and Maurizio Passerin d’Entreves. “Hannah Arendt.” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalata & Uri Nodelman (eds.), Fall 2024 Edition, 12 February 2024, plato.stanford.edu/cgi-bin/encyclopedia/archinfo.cgi?entry=arendt.
